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Abstract: 
The spate of democratic wave that blew across the continent of Africa in the 1990s came with the hope of 
economic transformation and an end to the decades of backwardness, poverty and want. Prior to this period, 
democratic governance was the exception rather than the norm. Military high command across the continent 
dictated the pace for many decades and most times falling short of the messianic appeal that drew them into 
politics and governing with their diktat nature and abuse of human rights, the economies of most countries of 
the continent where the military juntas were entrenched, experienced stall and retrogression, creating contrition 
for grumbling by the weakened civil society in these countries. However, the turn in the dynamics of the 
international system following the collapse of communism and insistence of the continent’s development 
partners on democratization, compelled many of the military juntas to retreat back to their barracks, thus 
opening the space for inflow of investments which is in dire need to reverberate the ailing economies. But after 
a brief spell of power in the hands of the civilian authorities, the lustre of power seem to be drawing some 
elements in the military high command to the old scenarios which resemble a reverse wave of democratization, 
thus allowing the gains of civilian advancement to be lost while the countries relapse. One of the expected areas 
of relapses with the resurgence of the military back in power is in capital flows into the countries for 
development purposes. The examines these issues and concludes that the resurgence of military rule in the West 
African sub-region is a set back to the development of the countries in the sub-region,  
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Introduction 
The transition to civilian administration 
from the military in most West African 
countries was neither easy nor smooth. The 
countries have been facing pressures of 
development from different quarters 
including their development partners who 
insisted on democratic governance for 
continuous support. In addition, it was 
becoming anachronistic to have military or 
persons in uniform being in office apart 
from their main official duty. Some of the 
military high command in power changed 
uniform by transforming to civilians in 
power while some handed over to their 
civilian cronies. The spate of 
democratisation sweeping across the   entire  
continent of Africa as a result of third wave 
global democratization process ensures that 
the military governments became obsolete 
by design. It also became a campaign for 
most of the development partners, knowing 
the obvious disadvantage of Military 
institutions in power the military in power 
to cause n exit of the institutions from 
directly holding  on to power in most 
African countries. On the side of business, 
most industrial nations also find it difficult 
to have contractual agreements with military 
men and found them difficult to 
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accommodate in the comity of nations 
where important issues that border on long 
term commitments are discussed. 
 
After a brief spell of power in the hands of 
the civilian authorities, the luctre of power 
seem to be drawing some elements in the 
military high command to the old scenarios 
which resemble a reverse wave of 
democratization, thus allowing the gains of 
civilian advancement to be lost while the 
countries relapse. One of the expected areas 
of relapses with the resurgence of the 
military back in power is in capital flows 
into the countries for development purposes. 
Though African countries of the West have 
not been noticed or recorded to be doing 
well in the area of capital inflows 
(UNCTAD 2010, 2011), the conditions may 
worsen and developmental targets and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
not be met in these countries. The civilian 
administrations may have improved the 
environment somewhat, but it is evident the 
re-entry of the military into power cannot 
improve the situation no matter how 
altruistic their intention of man in uniform 
who seize power is (Abubakar 2008). Many 
of incursions are blamed on deteriorating 
conditions of life and institutions but it is 
not noticed that the military itself as an 
institution at the very least has received any 
benefit from such political expeditions. 
While capital flows into different sectors of 
the economies where benefits and returns 
can be reaped in accordance with the 
investors’ horizon have been continuous in 
its little form, the fear that the flows may 
result in sudden stop or retrenchment or in 
certain cases expropriation of assets is 
palpable. 
 
Many of the causes and determinants of lack 
of development in a military government 
can be traced to governance and 
transparency problems which the developed 
countries but the Multinationals or 
Transnational Corporations (MNCs and 
TNCs) in these countries are completely 
averse to. The basic objective of this paper 
is to examine the impact of  the comeback 
of military governments can have on capital 
flows or Foreign direct investment into 
these countries and to specifically discover 
if the level of development  and its 
momentum  can be maintained in spite of 
the loss of democratic governance by these 
countries. The paper is organised as follows: 
section 2 deals with the review of available 
literature comes after the introduction. 
Sections 3 discuss the methodology, model 
and sources of data while section 4 
discusses the results. The last section makes 
recommendations and concludes the paper. 
 
Review of Literature 
While the basic rule international 
investment flows in virtually every country 
has been attract FDI at all costs, it has been 
noted that it does not all the come with solid 
theorised benefit but with some costs as 
well. In spite of this its benefits to African 
economies cannot be overemphasised at this 
time for national development purposes. On 
the positive side are studies such as Bellak 
(2004) and Mayer-Foulkes and 
Nunnenkamp (2005). On the other side are 
studies of Van Pottelsberghe and 
Lichtenberg (2001) and Akinlo (2004). 
Evidence for need of FDI has tended to the 
positive side though the negative side has 
not been controlled by these economies. 
Stehrer and Woerz (2005) also found strong 
support for the clamour for FDI by countries 
including emerging and developed countries 
of the world by the impacts it has on the 
productivity and output. Its impact on 
export led growth and wages of the 
economies of the countries they studied 
were quite significant. The paper discovers 
a bi-directional causality between 
productivity and FDI inflows, but with 
inflows having little effect on the spurning 
of growth of domestic investment. It also is 
not significant in the pulling entrepreneurial 
growth efforts in the economies.  
 
A plethora of determinants cause the FDI to 
flow in particular ways. Global causes of 
capital flows have been held to the real 
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interests in the United States and to a less 
extent the prices of commodities (Byrne and 
Fiess, 2011). The impact of the outflows on 
FDI is quite significant since the outflows 
impel some pressure on the performance of 
emerging and frontier economies and 
especially developing countries of Africa. 
Arguments have evolved on the push factors 
for FDI and generally revolved round about 
the Marginal PK which seems higher 
elsewhere especially in capital scarce 
countries. A large proportion of the profits 
of the MNCs are realised from the emerging 
and developing countries (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Large companies realize 26 to 28 percent 
rate of return from Africa which is one of 
the highest rates in the world (Snyder 2003). 
Other prevailing determinants of capital 
inflows and especially FDI flows into sub-
Saharan Africa have been eclectic, 
localisation determinants while push factors 
have remained constant over the years. The 
importance of FDI is underscored by the 
ultimate net value additions to the 
entrepreneurial ability of the domestic 
investors (Kumar and Pradhan, 2002). FDIs 
mainly come through Multinational 
Corporations which seek and obtain various 
advantages before investing. The more 
profitable inflows of FDIs have been 
through greenfields rather than through 
mergers and acquisitions, while brownfields 
have not been so common. 
 
Ahlquist (2006) discusses the role of 
stability of governmental policies on flows 
of direct and portfolio types. While portfolio 
investors react to fiscal policy outcomes, 
changes in the policies by reallocating their 
invested capital, direct investors react to 
changes in political institutions due to their 
more stable nature. The more stable the 
policies governing the institutions are, the 
more stable the direct investment. The 
Lucas (1990) paradox becomes real in the 
African situations where the MNCs are 
expected to lead in investment now lag and 
sudden changes in the environments induce 
further capital retrenchment or flow 
reversals. Though answers were less 
plausible at the time, other solutions seem to 
have emerged as a result of the somersault 
type of policies that African governments 
plunge their economies into. 
 
Over the years the traditional determinants 
of FDIs have changed somewhat with 
globalisation leading the changes (Kokko, 
2002). Also issues such as democratisation 
of the governance and polity have been key 
(Addison and Heshmati 2003).  Ajayi 
(2007) reasons that the choice of a particular 
domestic environment to locate facilities is 
informed by whether the MNC is market 
and resource seeking (for example Nigeria) 
for its outputs or seeking cost reduction or 
efficiency in production to export (for 
example the Export Processing Zones). 
Undoubtedly, portfolio flows have less 
stability and therefore less reliability and 
less sought after than FDI which tends to be 
more reliable. Irrespective of policies of the 
governments in place, (military or civilian) 
the environments, (industry and business) 
do matter. The environments dictate the cost 
and pricing structure of the eventual 
products of the foreign investor - the MNC. 
 
Military incursions in the politics of African 
countries have many root causes ranging 
from acute contestation of political power to 
mismanagement of the economy. More 
importantly the military have blamed 
civilian governments for economic 
mismanagement and corruption and have 
cited this as the reason for their incursion to 
power. It is clear from literature that the 
military is not respected in the international 
financial and economic community due to 
their lack of legitimacy and more 
importantly possibility of lack of respect for 
agreements. Military governments are more 
likely to foist restrictive regulatory regimes 
on the country leading to reversals of earlier 
gains of deregulation and liberalisation. 
Nevertheless the interest in the exploitation 
of resources from Africa either by the 
foreign powers or by the Multi National 
Corporations MNCs has continued unabated 
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(Barnes, 2004). Coups and countercoups 
were rife with no accountability; 
factionalism occurred but with support of 
foreign powers while authoritarianism and 
high level of corruption existed. Military 
governments have tended to weaken 
economic performance with their focus on 
extractive industries basically for the 
purpose of exploitation of resources and 
undermine the institutions that encourage 
the entrenchment of democratic values. 
 
Resurgence of Military Coup D’états 
According to Oyediran (1989), there are 
three dominant positions in the literature on 
military rule in Africa. Some see the 
military as the best organised institution and 
a reliable manager of social change in 
developing countries. This is hinged on the 
fact that the military institution is highly 
disciplined, as such having the capacity to 
guarantee the necessary stability for 
economic development (Guteridge 1982, 
Horowitz 1966 Pye 1960). Others believe 
that development and reform can only be 
brought by revolution to which only the 
regular constitute the principal obstacle to 
such process of change in developing 
countries. This is because the military 
institution is naturally conservative and 
oligarchic and always allies the middle who 
tries to uphold the status quo which is in 
their class advantage (Nun 1957). The last 
perspective views the military as incapable 
of making real efforts towards building 
lasting political institution. It sees the 
military as conservative and unproductive 
(Huntington 1969). 
 
The 1960s were once called the “the 
military decade in Africa,” given that the 
continent was plagued by coups during this 
period (Zoiberg 1973). In West Africa, 
Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, 
Sierra Leone and Mali all experienced one 
or more successful coups between 1960 and 
1970 alone.(McGowan 2006) In the 1960s 
and 1970s, three-quarters of African leaders 
were assassinated or forced from office by 
coups d’état. Before the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, only five countries in Africa 
held competitive elections on a regular 
basis.(Greenblatt 2012). The dynamics was 
changed following the third wave 
democratic wind that swept most of these 
regimes away and ushering in regimes that 
could lay claim to power through multi-
party electoral processes. These changes 
witnessed at the national political levels also 
played out in international relations. Apart 
from development partners insisting that 
African countries must democratize to have 
access to funds, regional institutions such as 
the Economic Community of West African 
States ECOWAS and the African Union AU 
has enshrined it in their protocol and charter 
that only democratically elected officials 
would be allowed to have dealings with the 
institutions respectively. 
 
The shared combination of these factors is 
enough to push almost all the countries in 
the continent towards the path of democracy 
and openness. However the nature of these 
societies particularly countries of the west 
African sub-region and the structure of the 
political economy makes the foundation of 
these democracies shaky with constant 
threat of collapsing or not holding up. Some 
of these countries have been able to endure 
great elastic push which others such as Mali, 
Niger, Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome/ 
Principe were not able to withstand. In these 
counties the intervention of the military can 
no longer be said to be corrective as the 
military institution has been fingered as the 
problem for most of them but the trail of 
these scenario is uncertainty and instability 
that is detrimental to the economic 
wellbeing of these countries. 
 
The question we should attempt to answer 
here is why does the military institution 
abandon its traditional role for the society 
and dive into direct participation and control 
of state apparatus? So many factors have 
been advanced as responsible for this 
development. 
The first point here is the complex relationship 
that exists between the civil authority and the 
military, the problem of civil-military relations. 
Some scholars such as Wintrobe (1988), 
Wintrobe (1990) and Mcguire, Olson (1996).and 
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Besley and Robinson (2009) has analyze the 
opposition between civil government 
(democratic or non-democratic) and military 
dictatorship. Acemoglu et al. (2010) on his part 
attempted to categorize dictatorial regime 
types into three viz; non-democratic civil 
government, military dictatorship and 
democratic civil government. The study 
identifies the army as agent of the powerful 
elite which uses it as an instrument to 
guarantee its survival through repression of 
decent. The uneven income distribution in 
these societies and the relevance of the army 
becomes stronger, especially in a contest where 
the political competition takes shape between 
polarized groups, fighting to obtain power and 
rents. The origin of these groups develops along 
different cleavages, such as ethnic or regional 
origins, religion, ownership of the production 
factors and so on. The clash between these 
polarized and fragmented groups determines 
winners and losers, involved in violent fighting 
to gain the control of the State (Hammond and 
Axelrod, 2006; Montalvo and Reynal Querol, 
2007; Alesina et al., 2003 and Fearon, 2004). It 
is this kind of social situation with different 
groups fighting for power that raises the 
opportunity for civil war and coup d’état.   
 
The continent of Africa is characterized by a 
high degree of unconsolidated democracy, 
hybrid democracy, civil autocracy and 
military dictatorship in spite of third wave 
democratization that blew across the 
continent. For example, authoritarian 
systems are based on a nonexistent political 
pluralism where power is shared between 
some organizations that guarantee support 
and security to the regime. Under military 
dictatorship the army has the most important 
role on stage, its power is less checked 
which a times produces kleptocratic regimes 
(Acemoglu e al., 2003), where the dictator 
can grab a lot of resources and guarantee his 
survival through the divide-et-impera. This 
scenario makes it possible for elite 
contestation for the control of the State. This 
occurs when new group emerges, thus 
giving rise to new elites that want to handle 
the rents and revenues (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006). In the case of the 
developing countries – where productive 
sectors like manufacturing, productive 
agriculture, utilities, services and others are 
very weak, this process has the goal to 
obtain central power, with the wealth given 
by oil, diamond or other resources.  Here 
contestation for control is hinged on three 
basic aspects regarding the production 
factors: appropriation, division and 
production. This ultimately, drives 
differences in the opportunity to enjoy the 
public goods between losers and winners, 
through different enforcement of the 
property rights and contracts (Tangerås and 
Lagerlöf, 2008; Gonzales, 2005, 2010; Dal 
Bò and Powell, 2007). 
 
Bolhken (2009), has noted that the risk of a 
coup d’état could be a strong deterrent to 
uncontrollable episodes of rent-seeking, 
corruption and extra-budget funds than the 
electoral process in democracies. The blend 
between the democratic checks and military 
risk reduces the commandeering of the state 
wealth. This is the same dynamics that 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use to 
explain the transformation of the political 
system: 1) a situation without violence, 
because there is redistribution between the 
groups, driving to cooperation. Here income 
inequality would be very low, so that the 
elite does not fell threat from the extending 
of the redistribution; 2) to respond to the 
violence caused from no fairness in the 
redistribution, the ruling elite could draft in 
the most productive and dangerous groups, 
sharing with them the wealth and the rents 
of the country. In this situation, income 
inequality is higher than before, and this 
threatens the conservative elite; 3) the elite 
does not want to share the rents with other 
groups, therefore causing competition and 
violence. Just like before, income inequality 
is very high. Hence, it is possible to say that 
higher income inequality could raise the 
probability of a civil war and, consequently, 
request a larger army for the repression. 
But, at least, this could increase the 
opportunity for coup d’état. In this contest, 
49 
Covenant Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), September, 2013 
 
both Besley and Robinson (2009) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) see the army like 
guardian of the elite, as an agent that acts to 
defend it from the risk of civil war. The 
central government will choose the size of 
the army, but it faces an agency problem: 
the army may not only be the instrument to 
defend the elite, but may seize the power. If 
the government increases the size of the 
army to respond to a higher risk from the 
loser groups, this increases the opportunity 
for a coup d’état, but diminishes its 
opportunity cost. 
 
In Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and 
Besley and Robinson (2009) state capacity, 
the quality of institution and the problem of 
violence are analyzed.  State capacity here is 
the quality of the legal and fiscal capability 
of the central power. The low level of these 
two aspects raises income inequality, 
uneven distribution of public goods and bad 
use of wealth, creating tensions and 
grievances in the society. When property 
rights and contracts are not properly 
enforced (low legal capacity) and the level 
of taxation is collected from a source that is 
not under the complete control of the 
government - like natural resources - (low 
fiscal capacity) the distribution of the public 
goods between the different groups is highly 
uneven, thus raising the risk of civil unrest. 
To maintain their economic, social and 
cultural insulation, the elite have to establish 
an efficient monopoly of violence. The loser 
groups that are not protected by right and 
contract, and that could not check the use of 
taxation and state rents, presenting unequal 
and low income, have the opportunity to use 
the civil war to gain the central power. So, 
the government has to create an army in 
order to counter this threat. However, the 
establishment of a bigger army may turn to 
be dangerous, because the military can 
actually exploit the use of force. In such a 
case, a classical principal-agent problem 
would take shape. Persson and Robinson 
(2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2010),has 
pointed out that the military could act no 
more like agent of the government, but in 
their own interest. This happens when the 
military believes that they are not paid a 
‘fair wage’, they could behave as more like 
self-interested agent than agent of the 
central government. 
 
In sum, this increases the probability of a 
coup d’état.  Acemoglu et al. (2010) identify 
three different patterns to underline this: 1) 
the civil government could decide not to use 
the repression and hence establishes a little 
army, favouring the cooperation and a 
smooth transition to democracy. The new 
democratic government faces a big problem: 
in order to consolidate democracy it is 
necessary to reform the army, but they do 
not want to be reformed. In this instance it 
becomes possible to find a commitment 
problem, because the government has to 
promise to the military that it will not 
reform it – otherwise they will block the 
transitional process - but to permit the 
consolidation of the democracy this reform 
is necessary; 2) the civil government may 
want to use repression against social 
opposition. They create a big army but they 
have to pay a right price (wage and public 
goods) that avoid the recourse to coup 
d’état. The non-democratic government 
remains in office and the coup d’état does 
not happen; 3) The government uses the 
army to avoid the opposition take over of 
power, so they create a big army but they 
are unable, or do not want, to pay the right 
price for their services. Ultimately the army 
takes the power establishing a military 
dictatorship. The same dynamics could be 
extrapolated from Besley and Robinson 
(2009): the civil government needs the help 
of the army, through the repression, to block 
the social opposition and the risk of civil 
war, but has to pay the right price for this 
action and protection. If this does not 
happen, the military seize the power putting 
down the previous government. This vicious 
cycle characterizes both models, helping to 
explain the relationship between the 
redistribution of public goods, civil war and 
coup d’état. 
 
La Porta et al (1999) in their study has 
shown that there is growing evidence that a 
low level of institutional quality is a 
fundamental source of waste of the wealth. 
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It also determines an uneven distribution of 
public goods between different groups. As 
such, a low institutional quality stimulates 
the grievances of the loser groups, boosting 
their willingness to use violence and 
increasing the probability that a civil war 
takes shapes. This makes it more likely that 
central elite/government resort to repression 
by the army, creating a larger one, raising 
the likelihood of a military dictatorship. In 
general, provision of public goods differs 
dramatically between democracies and 
dictatorships. Democracies exceed 
dictatorial provision (Deacon, 2009). 
 
Needless to say, there is predictable linkage 
between the availability of natural resources 
and such kind of argument. The rents 
emerging from controlling the mining sector 
increase the likelihood of an actual conflict 
between the ruling group and the military or 
another competing group. In other words, 
the existence of natural resources contribute 
to the insulation of the elite in charge, by 
reducing the capacity of enforcing property 
rights and contracts, thus raising the risk 
that the loser groups use violence and civil 
war to depose the government. 
Consequently, natural resources increase the 
probability in the use of repression through 
the army, and, eventually the likelihood of a 
military dictatorship. 
 
External Determinants of Coups D’état 
External factors can also affect the 
probability of a coup d’état: if a country has 
some neighbours experiencing ethnic wars 
and violence, and inside its borders it 
reproduces the same cleavages, it could be 
influenced by this circumstance, 
reproducing these problems. That is, a 
contagion effect may exist. However, 
Besley and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu 
et al (2010) emphasize that if a country 
perceives a serious threat of a war between 
two states, this would reduce the risk of a 
coup d’état because the army is now 
necessary for the survival of both the 
government and the state. Therefore, the 
politicians (democratic or non-democratic) 
have to pay the right wage to soldiers, 
solving the commitment problem that we 
have analyzed before. A credible threat on 
the borders can reduce the coup's risk. De 
Groot (2011) emphasizes the role of 
external influences in determining political 
freedom in Africa. He finds that the 
probability of an improvement in political 
freedoms increases with a history of 
political freedom, openness, and 
improvements in ethno linguistically similar 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Coups d’état in Africa have received some 
attention in the literature by sociologists and 
political scientists. For instance Jackman 
(1978) estimates a model of the structural 
determinants of coups d'état for the newly 
emerged states of Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
years from 1960 through 1975.  The results 
from that study indicate that social 
mobilization and the presence of a dominant 
ethnic group are destabilizing; a multiparty 
system is destabilizing (especially when a 
dominant ethnic group exists) while 
electoral turnout in the last election before 
independence is stabilizing. Johnson et al. 
(1984) replicate the previous work 
concentrating on military coups, finding 
serious weaknesses in the original Jackman 
model. The dataset in this study includes 35 
Sub-Saharan African states from 1960 
through 1982. They find that states with 
relatively dynamic economies and whose 
societies were not very socially mobilized 
before independence and which have 
maintained or restored some degree of 
political participation and political pluralism 
have experienced fewer military coups, 
attempted coups, and coup plots than have 
states with the opposite set of 
characteristics. Jenkins and Kposowa 
(1990), using data on military coups in 33 
Sub-Saharan African states between 1957 
and 1984, discovered strong support for 
modernization and competition theories of 
ethnic antagonisms, military centrality 
theory and aspects of dependency theory. 
Political development theory is not 
supported. Ethnic diversity and competition, 
military centrality, debt dependence, and 
political factionalism are major predictors of 
coup de tat. 
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It was also discovered that ethnic 
dominance is a stabilizing force that create 
social integration and weakening 
opposition. Intractable conflicts rooted in 
ethnic competition and economic 
dependence appears to create a structural 
context for military coups and related 
instabilities. O'Kane (1993) argues that the 
underlying causes of coups are 
specialization in and dependency on 
primary goods for export, exacerbated by 
poverty. A testable hypothesis is deduced 
from this theory which is examined through 
the application of discriminant analysis to 
data for three sets of African countries. The 
models support the theory. Moreover, the 
chance of a successful coup is negatively 
related with the absence of a previous coup 
and the continuing or historic presence of 
foreign troops since independence. Tusalem 
(2010) finds that over the 1970-1990 
periods the likelihood of a military coup is 
reduced by the protection of property rights. 
 
Lunde (1991) studies African coups d’état 
during the period from 1955 to 1985. The 
starting point is a replication of Jackman 
(1978) when continuous-time hazard models 
of event history data are used instead of the 
panel regression approach. The event 
history approach focuses on the rate of coup 
d'etats over time rather than some index of 
coup d'etat. The results lend some support 
to modernization theory. The social 
contagion hypothesis and the history of 
political instability are also supported. 
Finally, the results indicate that the 
likelihood of a coup strongly depends on 
time. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) in a panel of 
African countries from 1960 to 2001 
highlight strong similarity in the causes of 
coups and civil wars, finding that low 
income and lack of growth are among the 
main determinants. Both are also subject to 
‘traps’ – once a coup or civil war has 
occurred, further events are much more 
likely. Finally, policies that favour the 
military (high military expenditure) may 
increase the risk of a coup. These have been 
the bane of Africa prior to the third wave 
democratic wind that blew across the 
continent. But even when some has begun to 
place regime change via coup de tat as a 
relic, resurgence is rearing up again in part 
of the continent. Ogude (2012) posits that 
this resurgence of military rule in parts of 
Africa especially West African sub-region 
can be attributed to many factors, which are 
not very different from those factors that 
pushed the military into politics in the years 
of post-independence. Specifically he 
identified the non entrenchment of 
democracy in some African countries, the 
quest by incumbents to subvert the 
democratic processes in other to hang on to 
power, the lack of socio-economic 
development in these countries which stokes 
instability, creating the condition for coup 
de tat. In that same study Ogude (2012) also 
identified destructive civil-military relation 
resulting in fight for power as explanatory 
variables for the resurgence of the military 
rule in West African sub-region.  
 
Return to Military Government and 
Analytical Framework 
Transitions to democracy became a fad for 
many countries of sub-Saharan Africa as 
from1990s (Fosu, 2008). Some happened 
through blood and violence while others 
were negotiated. Iys were expected to felt in 
many areas and especially on the well being 
and development of the respective countries. 
Acemoglu, (2009) and Rodrik 2005 have 
reported positive impacts with expectation 
of strong institutions that eliminates some 
evils still in place; have not been entirely 
beneficial. The main impact of 
democratisation has been on the seeming 
progress towards a market based economy 
(Sorensen 2010)  General conclusions have 
been negative on the immediate impact of 
democratisation as Sarky (2012) indicates  
the total impact of democracy has been the 
bane of income in sub-Saharan Africa. 
dominant West African countries have lost 
some ground in the FDI flows in the recent 
past due to changes in the domestic  
  52 
Covenant Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), September, 2013 
 
environments in the oil industry and nascent 
entry of Ghana which is not sufficient to 
replace the reduction being suffered by 
Nigeria (UNCTAD, 2011) in the face of 
current internal securities challenges posed 
by the a supposedly religious sect. Worse 
still, the two countries have also lost the 
civilian governance to military which is 
expected to impact negatively against their 
financial interrelation with external world. 
 
The West African sub-region has always 
been a mixed bag. During the colonial era 
the region produced a mixture of intense 
nationalist struggle that took the form of 
warfare and extreme repression as is the 
case with Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde to 
relatively easier struggles that centres on 
debate and superior arguments as is the case 
with Nigeria and Ghana. It is also within 
this region that the waves of military 
intervention in politics in the 1960s played 
out, while some states such as Senegal and 
Ivory Coast remained stable under civilian 
one regime that were not necessarily 
democratic. The region has also had its own 
shares of internal upheavals and wars in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Nigeria as 
well as an arena where the headwind of 
democratic third wave where a national 
sovereign conference turned around the 
dynamics in Benin and Mali. That trend 
almost spread across sub-Saharan Africa, 
but where it was most pronounced was the 
West African sub-region where almost all 
the countries of the continent embraced 
some form of democracy. This even went to 
the extent where it was stipulated in the 
ECOWAS protocol that only democratic 
change of government can be acceptable 
and recognised. 
 
Though Acemoglu et al. (2010) and Besley 
and Robinson (2010)) analyses that the 
relationship between the civil government in 
Africa and the military as an agency 
problem in the sense that the civilian 
government needs the army to avoid internal 
violence, but a larger army reduces the 
opportunity-cost for the military to run a 
coup d’état and seize power. The resurgence 
of military coup de tat in West Africa 
particularly required closer look to establish 
whether the main causes of military revolve 
around income inequality, ethnic 
fractionalization, and external threat that 
seem to drive coups previously in the 
region. 
 
The first sign came in the early hours of 22 
March 2012, with news of a military coup 
d’état in Mali. The coup leaders claimed a 
lack of adequate means and resources to 
fight Tuareg insurgents in the north of the 
country as the main reason for their action. 
That announcement by on state television by 
the coup leaders effectively puts an end to 
the administration of Amadou Toumani 
Toure as president of Mali. Barely three 
weeks later, on 12 April 2012, the 
government of Guinea Bissau was toppled 
by elements of the country’s military after 
alleged plans by the former to downsize the 
military. Interestingly, both coups occurred 
only a couple of weeks prior to scheduled 
presidential elections. In Mali, outgoing 
President Toure had made clear his intention 
to hand over power to a democratically 
elected president after the 29 April 2012 
elections. In Guinea-Bissau, a second round 
of presidential elections was also scheduled 
for 29 April 2012, although the leading 
opposition candidate had opted to boycott 
the polls, claiming fraud in the first round. 
Although accession to power through 
elections has become the norm in Africa, the 
two recent coups d’état in West Africa have 
underscored lingering deficiencies in 
Africa’s contested electoral democracies 
and their influence on the reoccurrence of 
coups, particularly in the West African sub-
region (Ogude, 2012). 
 
Niger 
The kind of civilian rule perpetuated by 
President Mamadou Tandja of Niger and its 
potential catastrophic consequences has a 
lot to do with the success the coupists in 
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Niger recorded. This explains why the 
recent development in Niger did not arouse 
bitter resentment against the Junta by the 
Nigerien populace. The regional grouping, 
the Economic Community for West African 
States (ECOWAS) realizing this, did not out 
rightly condemn the coup, but urged the 
coup leaders to act quickly to restore 
civilian rule. The cynicism towards civilian 
governments and elections are being 
discredited by the actors within the 
democratic process which creates the 
opening for changes by other means. The 
contempt towards corrupt civilian 
governments is widely shared and Africans 
seem to have concluded that these 
governments that have upped expectations, 
fail to deliver and when the electorate 
appears helpless to hold them accountable, 
option from the military seem a welcome 
trend as indications show from the recent 
military resurgence in the sub-region. 
 
 
Tandja used democracy to wage war against 
the media, the civil society and political 
parties. He hastily drafted a constitution that 
did not benefit from input from either civil 
society or the general public. He simply 
extended his term by 3 years, apparently 
without election, and allowed for an 
unlimited number of presidential terms. And 
yet there cannot be a democracy without a 
civil society; none without a media, and is 
almost unthinkable without vibrant 
opposition political parties, as there is no 
democracy without the state.  Civilian 
governments without democratic soul or 
substance are sources of despair and 
instability, and no good can come out of 
them. At the same time there is less will and 
no international mechanism to enforce 
democratic elections. While banning taking 
force by force, we failed to come up with 
alternative sources of effecting political 
change.  
 
Mali 
Mali has clearly been portrayed as the 
poster-child of good democratic transition in 
West Africa following the democratic third 
wave that blew across the world. But this 
good report was shattered on Wednesday 
March 23
th
, 2012 when its president, 
Amadou Toumani Touré, was toppled by a 
military junta, thereby setting the clock 
backwards for the country that seemingly 
had made a progress on the path of 
democracy.  What is ironic about the Malian 
coup was that it happened less than one 
month before the next presidential election. 
The big question that bugs the mind is to 
examine the reason behind a resurgence of 
the military in a country seen to have made 
a progress on democracy for over a decade 
witnessing transition from one 
administration to another in a democratic 
order (Ndonga, 2008). 
 
The answer cannot be farfetched from the 
fall-out of the conflict in Mali involving the 
Tuareg minority in the North, the latest 
round of which has been simmering since 
the coup occurred, had been proving 
unexpectedly difficult for government 
forces to quash. It is obvious inability of the 
government in Bamako to act decisively 
over the Tuareg rebellion, that triggered a 
cabal of soldiers, and led by junior officers, 
to express their disaffection by seizing the 
Presidential palace and State TV station 
(Nossiter, 2012). 
 
Seizure of the Palace therefore is sure part 
of a string of protests over the way the 
Malian government has failed to handle the 
Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) has been fighting for a separate 
state (its population is spread across the 
borders into neighbouring Algeria and 
Niger), and the army have felt increasingly 
on the back-foot, accusing the Toure 
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government of failing to provide them with 
sufficient arms and support to defeat the 
insurgency. The mutiny-turned-coup ignited 
as the Defence Minister, General Sadio 
Gassama, visited a military base in the town 
of Kati, approximately 13 miles from the 
capital, on the said Wednesday morning that 
the coup took place. As the General 
departed, protestors began stoning his car 
and by the afternoon had seized control of 
the television station in the Bamako, before 
taking the Palace in the evening. 
 
The Army’s disquiet is also reflected by 
military families and the wider populace, 
particularly in the south of the country, who 
are unhappy at reports of heavy losses the 
army is suffering. February saw thousands 
of citizens take to the streets in protest over 
the way in which the government had been 
handling the uprising. Yet, that a coup 
should have occurred so close to the April 
29
th
 elections, when Touré was due to step 
down, is highly significant. It has been 
suggested that the seizure of power in this 
way is indicative of a sentiment among 
sections of the military, and their supporters 
in civilian society, who believe that 
politicians are unable to competently 
resolve the rebellion in the North.  
 
 
FDI Flows 
 
 
FDI Stocks  
 
 
 
Depletion Rate of FDI Stocks for the Countries 
 
Source: From Authors Calculations  
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The coup had indeed, interrupted of Mali’s 
democracy and jeopardised its status as 
bedrock of democracy in West Africa. Not 
having the right weapons to kill their fellow 
countrymen may be one, catalytic, cause for 
the coup; just as likely, however, is the 
proximate explanation which has seen 
Touré divide and exploit internal 
relationships within Tuareg society, 
protracting violence to the point where the 
Army feel incapable of winning. Even 
though programmes for peace and 
reconciliation, promised by the president 
following previous rebellions, have failed to 
get off of the ground – although many 
Tuareg were previously integrated into the 
Malian Army, some do not see the Tuareg 
as Malian citizens. Inspired in part by the 
diversion caused by the military coup, 
Tuareg rebels in the north launched 
incursions deeper into Mali, seizing towns 
and bases formerly held by government 
forces fighting the conflict that caused the 
coup (Lewis, and 2012). As military forces 
have been engaged in consolidating their 
hold on the capital, the rebels have been 
able to push southward with little 
opposition. The distraction of the 
government troops provided avenue for the 
MNLA to make advances and consolidate 
their hold in the north of Mali. Their new 
found strength also attributed to the Arab 
Spring especially the fall of Ghadafi whose 
renegades ran to Mali and West Africa with 
lots of arms that has now got into the hands 
of the rebels. The capture of strategic towns 
in northern Mali by the MNLA including 
the ancient city of Tinbuktu, Gao and 
douzenta prompted the separatists group 
announce an end to the rebellion and 
declaring an Islamic republic of Azwad 
(Dioura and Diarra 2012) . 
 
Though the events in northern Mali 
complicated issue, the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the International 
community stance on the coup in Mali was 
enough to force the coupists to recede even 
though president Traore was not restored 
back to government. A compromise was 
brokered in which an Interim government 
headed by Cheick Modibo Diarra to 
organise an election to restore democracy 
but the issue of MNLA and northern Mali is 
posing a serious challenge to that that has 
seen the intervention of United Nations and 
African Union planning to launch an attack 
on Mali to dislodge the rebels from their 
position. 
 
Guinea Bissau 
The situation in Guinea Bissau prior to 
April 12
th
 , 2012 when some elements in the 
military succeeded in toppling the 
democratic government of Carlos Gomes 
Junior, we had witnessed instability sparked 
by attempts to topple the government on 
previous occasion. The military unrest of 
2010 and a failed coup attempt in 2011 as a 
result of infighting between the Navy and 
the Army and the free flow of drugs from 
Europe and Latin America which has made 
the country a narcostate. The death of 
Malam Bacai Sanha on January 9
th
, 2012 led 
to preparation for a new election which was 
scheduled to be held within 90 days in 
accordance with the Guinea Bissau 
constitution. Despite a peaceful campaign, 
there were fears of possible violence or a 
coup d'état if the army which is obviously 
not ethnically balanced did not approve of 
the winner (Zounmenou, 2009).  
 
But the crux of the matter was the decision 
of Angola to withdraw its forces from the 
two-year old MISSANG mission to 
modernise the Guinea Bissau military. The 
Guinea Bissau military struck following the 
visit of Guinea-Bissau Defense Minister 
Jorge Tolentino Araujo to Angola for a 
meeting with his counterpart Cândido 
Pereira dos Santos Van-Dunem and the 
Army Chief-of-Staff Geraldo Sachipengo 
Nunda on the 16
th
 of April 2012. He was 
also expected to visit the Higher Warfare 
School (ESG) and the Higher Technical 
Military Institute (ISTM).  All these coupled 
with unpopularity of Carlos Gomes Junior 
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with the army for his attempts to reform the 
institution where significant explanation for 
the coup. For instance, there was a report by 
SIC Noticias of Portugal a day before the 
coup where an unidentified military 
commander  claimed that Carlos Gomes 
Júnior would allow Angolan troops into the 
country citing a  "secret document" in the 
possession of the soldiers to justify his 
claim that Guinea-Bissau government is 
about to sanction an Angolan attack on 
Guinea-Bissau's military.  After they struck, 
the leaders of the coup released an unsigned 
communiqué that read they "did not have 
ambitions of power," the coup was a 
reaction to the alleged agreement with 
Angola that involved 200 military trainers 
because it would "annihilate Guinea-
Bissau's armed forces.  
 
The Guinea-Bissau coup d’etat was staged 
by elements of the armed forces about two 
weeks before the second round of a 
presidential election between Carlos Gomes 
Junior and Mohamed lala Embalo. Both 
candidates and the president were initially 
arrested by the junta. Members of the 
Military Council, which ran the country 
until an interim National Transitional 
Council was established on April 15
th
 2012, 
said that one of the reasons for the coup was 
the incumbent civilian administration's call 
for support from Angola to reform the 
military. Following international 
condemnation and sanctions against leaders 
of the junta, an agreement was signed that 
led to the third placed candidate in the 
election, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, 
becoming the interim president. 
 
Conclusion 
There are, at least, three sources of military 
interventions in what could be considered as 
the new generation of coups in Africa. The 
first is the indignation of the Generals. The 
second is the rage of the ranks. The third is 
when the state allows its own overthrow. 
There are cases when the civilians invited 
the military to take power. Probably a fourth 
aspect in the new generation of coups in 
Africa is what could be referred to as the 
French factor. Almost all recent coups took 
place in Francophone countries. Is it a 
Francophone phenomenon? If so, is it 
related to the way the French governed, and 
left, and returned? Or is it a coincidence?  
 
The recent of coups in West African sub-
region is not an anomaly and only 
epitomizes the current political ills, 
something like a quandary, in the African 
continent and should be treated as such. The 
resurgence of unconstitutional changes of 
government in Africa is a reflection of this 
deeper problem. What is common with 
these recent coups is that issues of spill over 
from election dispute is constant in all the 
cases as spark for the intervention of the 
military which shows that democracy in the 
continent is still fledgling. The second point 
is the issue of public service is yet to sink 
into the minds of people who seek power in 
Africa which is reflecting in the 
misgovernance that is cited by military 
juntas as excuse for upsetting the 
constitutional order. 
 
There is always enough reason to oppose 
any form of the involvement of the military 
in politics as a system. But such a system 
can only work if civilians behave 
differently. Banning the military alone will 
not solve Africa’s governance deficit. No 
one should expect the military to behave 
otherwise, while the civilian governments 
continue to act illegally, contemptuously 
and brutally. For it is a mistake to suppose 
that everything civilian or an elected 
government alone will save us from conflict 
and from the abuses of power to which it 
inevitably leads? Africans have forgotten a 
little too quickly that for the African army to 
be tamed, the African state has first to be 
democratized.  
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